I Am Bloody But Unbowed

As I have noted before, in his column explaining his Hall of Fame ballot this year, Jayson Stark again made it clear that he can’t bring himself to vote for Jim Rice. That is a perfectly acceptable decision to make. I don’t agree with it, but Rice is certainly not a slam-dunk vote, he makes people stop and think. Some are going to pass him over, for some very valid reasons.

But Stark did so this year in rather maddening fashion, and it pissed me off. Remember, Stark has always said that no player has made him think more about voting for him than Rice. He’s right on the edge of what Stark considers to be a Hall of Fame player, but he sees holes in Rice’s career that have always stopped him. Fair enough. It’s those holes that I, and I’m sure many others, have repeatedly attempted to address to Mr. Stark. Many of my previous articles on this subject on this site originated as lengthy emails to Jayson Stark. And, to be fair, he was gracious enough to not only reply to almost all of them, but to do so in a complimentary fashion while requesting that I keep in touch as each new ballot comes out.

I did exactly that this year. I’ve attached the full text of this year’s effort below, all 5000 words of it. It was, essentially, my all-out, guns-blazing assault on Stark, in the hope that I would not only convince him to change his vote, but to write about it in his national forum on ESPN. With luck, his voice could help sway other voters who sit on the fence about Rice as his eligibility nears an end. I had been chipping away at his stance for years, and I felt strongly that this year would be the coup de grace.

It didn’t happen. Not only did Stark not vote for Rice this year, but he did so in such a fashion that it may have damaged Rice’s case with others who were wavering. Stark renewed his stance that Rice was a one-dimensional player, despite volumes of evidence to the contrary and some acquiescence on his part in the past. He renewed his view that Rice’s career was too short, despite the fact that this is the same man who ignored the longevity issues of two other borderline candidates on this ballot – Dale Murphy and Bruce Sutter, without giving any explanation. And, tragically, despite his promise in the final line to keep his mind open to further arguments, the tone of Stark’s article was such that he appears to have finally put the Rice issue to bed for good. He seems to have reached a level of peace with rejecting Rice, and it doesn’t seem likely he will change his mind now after 10 years of rejecting Rice’s candidacy.

Not that I have any bullets left to fire. I mean, look at the email below. That’s 5000 words, some of which refer back to previous emails that were nearly as long. In total, I’ve probably dropped about three book chapters worth of prose on this guy, but he not only won’t change his mind, but really doesn’t give many solid response as to why. And remember, this is the same guy who voted for Lee Smith in his first year of eligibility, then dropped him from his ballot the very next year despite still having two open slots. He can change his mind at a whim, it seems, but won’t do so for Rice despite volumes of arguments in his favor. In fact, in the case of players like Dale Murphy and Rafael Palmeiro, it seems as if Stark uses one set of criteria to support election, but ignores those same criteria when considering Rice. He wrote an article about how Hall of Fame voters seem to have forgotten the 1980s, and has voted for several icons of that era, including Murphy, Sutter, Jack Morris, Andre Dawson, and Ryne Sandberg, but stops short of extending that support to Jim Rice, despite the fact that Rice dominated offensive statistics in the American League for most of that decade. Rice had decade-long stretches of leading the entire major leagues in at-bats, hits, RBI, and total bases. For the AL only, Rice spent decade or longer stretches leading the entire league in games, at-bats, runs, hits, home runs, RBI, slugging percentage, OPS, runs created, total bases and extra base hits. To Stark, these numbers would be convincing if we were talking about Dale Murphy, but when the subject is Jim Rice these facts fall short.

And he really doesn’t explain any of these contradictions. Ever. He just keeps repeating the same arguments as always – Rice couldn’t field, Rice could run, Rice’s career was too short – but never provides any comparative numbers or anecdotal information to support that, as Rice’s supporters have. He doesn’t substantively disprove anything Rice supporters say. It’s maddening.

I, for one, am done arguing with him. I don’t have anything left to say anyway, and none of it appears to be swaying him. Jayson Stark has some intractable stance against Jim Rice’s Hall of Fame candidacy that I don’t understand and he either won’t or can’t explain. Maybe he simply doesn’t have enough column space and there simply aren’t enough avid Rice supporters out there to justify a full-blown, column-length, documented explanation of why he thinks Jim Rice is unworthy of induction to Cooperstown. I would understand that, but it doesn’t make the situation any less frustrating.

(What follows is the text of my email to Jayson Stark, dated November 12, 2003. On this one, he sadly gave no reply. Please note that my references to WARP3 information on the site of The Baseball Prospectus are about 8 months old. Their links and their math may have changed in that time.)

Hello Jayson -

As promised and as you requested, I am pleased to offer this reminder for you to carefully review the case of one James Edward Rice on this year's ballot for the Baseball Hall of Fame. As is usually the case with my correspondence to you, this will be a lengthy email, so consider yourself warned.

My goal in this reminder is not to rehash arguments already made. You have been extremely tolerant of my ranting, so I won't re-state any of my previous points. I instead refer you to my previous emails (which you indicated you would put in your Jim Rice file - or perhaps your Lunatic Readers file) on the subject of your support of Rafael Palmeiro and Dale Murphy, respectively. They should provide a refresher of the comparative numbers between Rice and those players, as well as serve to point out the level of dominance compared to his league that Rice achieved. Also, please re-read the rather lengthy email I sent in which I tried to rebut your stated misgivings about Rice's qualifications. You were good enough to compliment me on the thoroughness of that response when you originally read it, and I think it still stands as a pretty comprehensive counter-argument to the criticisms Rice usually draws.

I will focus here on adding some additional detail to my previous arguments. I'd like to provide some numbers that show, compared to the current crop of left fielders already in the HOF, Rice seems to fit quite nicely. No, he is not the greatest left fielder ever. He's not even the greatest to play for the Red Sox. Or the 2nd-greatest for that matter. But he does compare well to HOF left fielders as a group. He wouldn't be barely sneaking in, dragging down the overall quality of HOF left fielders the way Tony Perez and Orlando Cepeda recently dragged down the overall quality of first basemen inducted into the Hall. Rice would fit somewhere in the middle of a pretty respectable group of Hall of Fame players - not top-5, not bottom-5, but somewhere in between.

For instance, as stated above, we already know that Rice is no Stan the Man, or Teddy Ballgame, or Yaz. Comparing him to any of them is meaningless. Rice is nowhere near their class of ballplayer. He is, however, exceptionally close to being the average of every other left fielder that is currently in the Hall. If we exclude The Big Three, acknowledging that they are far superior to Rice, and simply look at the average career numbers of the remaining 15 HOF left fielders, we find that the outcome closely matches the career numbers actually posted by Jim Rice:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
HOF AVG	2099	8009	1372	2490	196	765	1243	755	251	.310	.375	.477	.851
Rice	2089	8225	1249	2452	382	834	1451	670	58	.298	.352	.502	.854

There are, of course, some obvious differences. Rice was not a base stealer, as is no member of the Red Sox, so he's got about one-fifth of the Hall average in career steals. He also has to deal with the fact that a few leadoff types comprise the average, so he falls short of the average total of runs scored by 125. But he makes up for that shortfall, and then some, by exceeding the HOF average in RBI by more than 200. He's got a slightly lower batting average, and he has a significantly lower OBP, but his 25-point advantage in slugging allows him to post the same OPS as an average Hall of Famer. The other numbers are an extremely close match, or actually favor Rice. He's within 2% of the average in games, plate appearances, at bats, hits, and runs created. In all of the power categories, he enjoys a distinct edge over the average (9% more extra-base hits; 9% more total bases; 95% more homers). It's clear that using the raw totals of the group he is supposed to be compared to, Rice stacks up well. He played a career of average Hall length and posted offensive numbers the matched or exceeded most of the averages of Hall members.

Before you scream that the eras of all concerned don't match, let me be the first to agree with you. And allow me to point out that, in most cases, that actually favors Rice's case even more.

In order to make this clear, we need to even out the statistics to account for the various run-scoring eras. It would be easy, for example, to look at Goose Goslin's raw offensive numbers, lay them next to Rice's, and proclaim that Goslin was so clearly superior to Rice that we shouldn't even have the discussion. This is what that would look like:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Goslin	2287	8656	1483	2735	248	921	1609	949	175	.316	.387	.500	.887
Rice	2089	8225	1249	2452	382	834	1451	670	58	.298	.352	.502	.854

But that comparison wouldn't be fair to Rice, for obvious reasons. Goslin played during a time when teams averaged 5.1 runs per game. Rice played during a time when they averaged just 4.4. That's a gap of better than 15% that needs to be accounted for, as does the 6.5% gap between the home ballparks the two men played in, a difference that favors Rice unless we adjust for it.

As I said in one of my previous emails, there is an easy means of translating these numbers into a more neutral context, one developed by Bill James and outlined in The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract a couple of years ago. Performing that translation for Rice and Goslin results in these numbers:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Goslin	2287	8526	1367	2605	234	876	1483	896	165	.306	.375	.483	.858
Rice	2089	8198	1221	2425	377	823	1422	662	58	.296	.349	.498	.847

Suddenly we see that, once historical contexts are accounted for, Rice proves nearly the hitter Goslin was. There is only an 11-point gap in their OPS, with Rice showing significantly more power and slightly more run production per plate appearance than Goslin. That conclusion is born out by other statistical examinations as well. The OPS+ numbers of both men, according to the indispensable www.baseball-reference.com web site, is 128, meaning that each had a career OPS that was 28% better than the average of the leagues they played in. Looking at Total Baseball, we see that Rice had a Total Player Rating, or TPR, of 27.1 compared to Goslin's 26.1 (these may have changed - I'm looking at the 6th Edition; there has since been a 7th). Or, looking at the WARP3 calculation (which stands for Wins Above Replacement Player - a full explanation can be found here) developed by the gentlemen at The Baseball Prospectus, we see that Rice scored 92.6 to Goslin's 90.7. All signs point to the conclusion that Jim Rice and Goose Goslin were equally valuable and effective baseball players. Goslin, of course, is in the Hall of Fame and is generally considered to be a pretty average Hall of Famer. Rice, to date, has been overlooked.

These same adjustments can be made in a slightly different way. Instead of calculating the adjustments for both players in a neutral setting, you can leave one player constant and adjust the other player to the same conditions. For instance, I looked at both Al Simmons and Jim Rice, leaving Simmons' actual stats untouched, but performing the Bill James calculation on Rice's, giving him the ballpark factors Simmons enjoyed, as well as the run-scoring averages of the leagues Simmons played in. I made one final adjustment to Rice's numbers, discounting them to account for the difference in the 154-game versus 162-game seasons. The results were surprising:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Simmons	2215	8759	1507	2927	307	1095	1827	615	88	.334	.380	.535	.915
Rice	1985	8079	1411	2519	403	883	1635	705	64	.321	.376	.540	.916

Simmons certainly retained his durability/longevity edge, but from a qualitative perspective, Rice comes out with a career OPS one point better than Simmons. Breaking the two down to an average 154-game season, we get these numbers:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Simmons	154	609	105	204	21	68	127	43	6	.335	.381	.535	.916
Rice	154	562	98	180	28	62	114	49	4	.320	.375	.539	.914

Again, Simmons' durability allowed him to produce slightly higher counting stats, which certainly counts in his favor, but it's still clear that Rice, in context, was nearly as productive a hitter as Al Simmons, who is widely considered one of the top 6 or 8 left fielders of all time. Now, Simmons was a superior defensive player to Rice, capable of excellence in center field as well as left, and he contributed to World Series champions, which counts in his favor as well. He is a better overall baseball player than Jim Rice, but not by nearly the margin that the raw statistics would lead us to believe.

Similar comparisons can be made between Rice and other left fielders that are currently considered to be perfectly respectable, even high-ranking, members of the Hall of Fame. Such as Ed Delahanty:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Delahanty	2173	8906	1905	3081	119	956	1735	880	640	.346	.411	.505	.916
Rice	2150	9054	1791	3102	486	1057	2076	830	78	.343	.398	.577	.975

(These numbers assume 162-game schedules.)

And Jesse Burkett:

	G	AB	R	H	HR	XBH	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Burkett	2394	9767	2015	3319	87	677	1120	1201	458	.340	.417	.449	.866
Rice	2150	8952	1724	3000	481	1035	2000	804	76	.335	.390	.569	.959

(So do these.)

These are quality baseball players, among the best ever to play left field in the majors. And Jim Rice compares well to them once we remove the blinders that narrow our vision to just the raw numbers that should never be considered out of context.

The Baseball Prospectus has another number, EQA, which stands for Equivalent Average. It tries to produce, in a format that resembles batting average so it's easier to comprehend, the total value of a player as a hitter. For instance, Ted Williams' batting average in real life was .344, but his EQA is .368 since he hit so well but also displayed so much patience and power. It's a very solid measurement of the overall career value of a player's hitting ability.

These are the career EQA numbers for every left fielder currently in the Hall of Fame, with Jim Rice's included:

	EQA
T. Williams	.369
Musial	.331
Kiner	.319
Delahanty	.315
Stargell	.312
Burkett	.305
Medwick	.302
B. Williams	.301
Yastrzemski	.298
Rice	.298
Hafey	.298
Simmons	.296
Kelley	.295
Goslin	.293
Clarke	.292
O'Rourke	.290
Wheat	.285
Manush	.285
Brock	.282

As you can see, of the 18 current HOF left fielders, eight rank better than Rice, eight rank worse, and two are tied. As an offensive player, he is firmly in the middle of the group of left fielders who have been officially recognized as the best in the history of the game. Now, I concede that some of these players weren't the greatest selections (Joe Kelley, Chick Hafey, et al), and that other skills besides pure hitting are involved in evaluating a player's worth as a ballplayer (speed, defense, longevity, etc.). But you have previously stated that you believe Rice can be judged solely on his abilities as a hitter since you doubt his contributions in those other areas. (Something I have disputed in detail previously, and stand by to this day.) This makes it perfectly clear that for the one criterion you are measuring, Rice not only meets the standard of current Hall of Famers, but he does so comfortably. Jim Rice was a Hall of Fame hitter. There really can't be much of a dispute on that issue.

Another way to look at the issue is with Win Shares. As a system, I think it is still evolving, and it certainly isn't forgiving of a player of Rice's type, since it penalizes him harshly for strikeouts as well as double plays grounded into. (Without, it's only fair to note, allowing for the huge disparity in DP opportunities he faced. The system goes on raw totals only. In addition, any player whose career took place prior to World War II has an unfair advantage under Win Shares, since the very stats that drag down Rice's Win Shares totals - strikeout, double plays, caught stealing - we largely not officially kept and don't count against them. Win Shares makes no allowance for this fact.) Still, it does give a single number grade for a season, which can then be compared to players who achieved the same score in a different season. It allows us to do a fairly quick era adjustment. For instance, Rice's monumental MVP season of 1978 scored 36 in Win Shares. Only two players exceeded that this year - Barry Bonds and Albert Pujols. Gary Sheffield's ridiculously good season is the closest comparison, with a 35 score.

What if we look at Rice's career Win Shares total, season by season, and find a 2003 comparison? Wouldn't that give us a fair look at what Rice's numbers would compare to in today's environment? I think it would. So, here goes.

WS	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
282	2110	7795	1303	2350	481	37	407	1370	887	75	.301	.375	.529	.904

These totals represent a career with 282 career Win Shares, same as Jim Rice, only compiled with the 2003 stats of several players. Included, in order of Jim Rice's seasons they represent, were the seasons of Jason Lane, Preston Wilson, Hank Blalock, Chipper Jones, Gary Sheffield, Manny Ramirez, Kevin Millar, Jay Payton, Aubrey Huff, Luis Gonzalez, Hank Blalock, Jay Payton, Manny Ramirez, Eric Karros, Michael Tucker, and Dernell Stenson. Some of those players were repeated because Rice achieved the same Win Shares total in more than on season.

Note a couple of things. First, since Gary Sheffield's season was actually of slightly lower quality than Rice's 1978 campaign, to get the Win Shares total to match Rice's real total of 282, I had to use Jay Payton's 15-Win Share season to stand in for Rice's 14-Win Share 1985 campaign. Also, I tried to stick to players whose totals came from mostly offensive positions - the corner outfield and corner infield positions - to equate to Rice more closely. As you can see, building an equivalent to Jim Rice's career using 2003 statistics only, reveals that his failure to reach 400 homers and a career .300 batting average are flukes. In today's numbers, he would reach both. Also note that his real-life OBP and slugging percentages need to be inflated by about 25 points each to equate to the numbers being thrown around today. Rice's real-life OPS of .852 equates to an OPS of .904 in today's terms. This simulation actually shorts Rice one All-Star season and one 100-RBI campaign as well. But it does give him a 36 HR, 141 RBI rookie year that would usually garner the Rookie of the Year Award, indicating that his failure to get it in 1975 was also a fluke since he happened to have the misfortune of debuting on the same team as Fred Lynn. To make the same point in reverse, this simulation probably costs Rice his only MVP, since it's pretty clear that Sheffield (standing in for Rice's 1978) won't win it this year. Again, a fluke. In most years, Sheffield would be an obvious MVP, but he had the misfortune of putting up monster numbers the same year Bonds and Pujols did.

Note a few other things. For instance, this simulation gives Rice 925 career extra base hits. Only 37 men have done that. It's more than such unquestioned HOFers as Goslin, McCovey, Paul Waner, Gehringer, Killebrew, DiMaggio, and Heilmann, just to name a few. It gives Rice both a .300 career average and 400 homers. Only 10 men in history have done that and all of the eligible ones are in the Hall of Fame (Aaron, Ruth, Mays, Foxx, Williams, Ott, Gehrig, Musial - the other two are Jeff Bagwell and Frank Thomas). It gives him a career OPS over .900. The only men to accomplish that in as many plate appearance are Ruth, Williams, Gehrig, Bonds, Foxx, Hornsby, Mantle, Musial, Ott, Mays, Cobb, Aaron, Robinson, Heilmann, Speaker, Simmons, and Schmidt. Obviously, they are all in the Hall or soon will be.

Here's another way to look at it: In his rookie year of 1975, Rice was 41st in the league in games played, 16th in at bats, 4th in runs, etc. These translate into percentiles. He was in the 73rd percentile in games, for instance, and the 89th percentile in at bats, the 97th percentile in runs, etc. Going back to the 1924-1939 time period, what would those percentiles translate to? For instance, how many games would a player play in 1924 to be in the 73rd percentile? Using any number of handy baseball stats databases as a reference point, we find that it's 138 (remember, they played a 154-game season back then). Likewise, Rice's 22 homers in 1975 (92nd percentile), equates to 15 in 1925. His .309 batting average (97th percentile), equates to .344 in 1925. Doing this for every year from 1924 through 1939 gives us the numbers a player would have to post in that time period in order to equate to the number Rice posted from 1974 through 1989.

Note that I am NOT saying Rice would have posted these numbers himself - he has no time machine and even if he did, his race would have kept him out of the American League of that day. But these numbers do represent, in that league's context, a set of accomplishments that equate to the standing in relation to his league that Rice actually put up. Here they are:

G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
2078	8526	1629	2816	503	156	412	1869	818	85	.330	.389	.555	.944

(Note: Since he played so few games in 1974, I just stuck Rice's actual numbers into this graph, rather than hunt down the 1924 equivalents. Also, note how the total number of games played almost matches Rice's actual career total of 2089; even though they played on 154-game seasons at the time, they also didn't have a players' strike, which nearly makes up for the games Rice lost in 1981.)

Ten consecutive years with both 100+ runs and 100+ RBI. Fourteen consecutive years exceeding a .300 average. Nearly 1100 extra base hits. Nearly 1900 RBI. A .330 career average and .944 career OPS. This fictional player would be an immortal. Jim Rice obviously isn't, but how much of that is because of his own limitations and how much can be attributed to the fact that he didn't reap the benefit of playing in the kind of run-scoring environment that other HOF left fielders (Simmons, Goslin, Manush) enjoyed? Even if these were deflated to nullify the Fenway affect, they would barely dent the obvious qualifications of the man for Cooperstown.

The fact that Rice didn't reach these numbers is more indicative of the depressed run-scoring era he played in than his abilities to hit. I recognize the reverse of this argument is also true - had he played in the 1960s or in the Dead Ball Era, Rice's adjusted numbers wouldn't look to great at all. But this does illustrate that basing any judgments on his falling just short of a few statistical milestones is a poor practice. Had he played 50 years earlier or 20 years later and posted equivalent seasons to what he actually posted, he would be considered one of the game's all-time greats. It's all a trick of perception. Strip that away, making the context neutral, and it is clear that Rice, as a hitter, was of obvious Hall of Fame quality.

Whether being a Hall of Fame hitter makes him a decent selection as an overall Hall of Famer is the real issue. I believe that it does, based on the knowledge that left fielders are not on the field for their defense. They are there to hit, something Rice excelled at. Even if you don't agree with that, Rice's other contributions on the field were good enough - not stellar, but solid - that he ranks in the middle of current Hall of Famers even when measurements of a player's entire career are examined.

For instance, using that WARP3 calculation that I mentioned previously, these are the scores for current HOF left fielders, with Rice's score included:

	WARP3
Musial	188.2
T. Williams	170.1
Yastrzemski	157.0
B. Williams	119.3
O'Rourke	115.4
Delahanty	114.7
Simmons	113.5
Clarke	105.1
Medwick	100.9
Burkett	93.5
Wheat	92.9
Rice	92.6
Goslin	90.7
Stargell	88.3
Brock	87.3
Kelley	85.9
Kiner	77.0
Manush	68.5
Hafey	54.3

Even with other factors (defense, speed, etc.) considered, Rice is ranked higher than 7 of the current 18 Hall of Famers at his position. Just eleven are better, with Rice rating nearly the same as a player who few dispute belongs in the Hall, Zack Wheat. We would see similar results by examining Total Player Rating.

It think it's fair to say that few players who rate in the top dozen among Hall of Famers at their position don't belong in the Hall. There are certainly non-Hall members who rank as the equivalent or better of Rice (Barry Bonds, Rickey Henderson, Tim Raines, etc.) but in judging a player's Hall qualifications, it hardly seems fair to say "Well, I can't vote for him because, even though he's qualified based on the current group, a few better players will be coming down the pike in a few years. Once they're included, he won't rank as high." Well, yeah, but that's the whole point, isn't it? Based on that assumption, would anyone have been allowed into the Hall, other than the absolute elite? Would Lou Brock be a Hall of Famer using that scale? Or Ralph Kiner? Or Willie Stargell? Or Kirby Puckett? A-Rod, Nomar, Jeter, and the like are in the process of re-defining the shortstop position - does that mean the selections of Ozzie Smith or Luis Aparicio should be reversed? Under this kind of rule, the list of those thrown out on their ears would total about two-thirds of the current members. It's an unfair standard to apply. Based on the present, Jim Rice is a solidly qualified Hall of Famer at his position.

These measurements, of course, don't include any of the off-field intangibles you like to consider. I think I've already made my point that Rice's total off-field character hasn't been portrayed fairly, that he has actually been a very active member of his community and has contributed his name, time and money to a wide range of charitable activities. But, even if the worst is assumed of him, a shoddy character has rarely, if ever, been the sole reason used to bar a player from the Hall if his performance warranted induction. The list of pure bastards in the Hall of Fame would take a while to recite. And it includes some middle ground or even borderline players who have been inducted into the Hall despite being less-than-stellar citizens. Ralph Kiner and Jesse Burkett stand out in the left field group. Enos Slaughter's rampant racism didn't keep him out, despite a questionable baseball resume. Kirby Puckett is a pretty mediocre selection, but he made it in despite having snowed the entire baseball world into thinking he was a peach of a guy. Orlando Cepeda's drug conviction was forgotten long enough to induct him. Rice didn't do anything that even approaches the sins of these guys, all of whom are no better than average in terms of their Hall of Fame qualifications.

Okay, I think I have finally exhausted the points I wanted to make. And I'd like to think that they make it clear that, while he is not ever going to be considered a member of the super-elite, Jim Rice would be a respectable addition to the group of left fielders currently in the Hall of Fame. I'll refrain from throwing around a couple of junk arguments in his favor. (Such as; Did you know that only nine other players have matched or exceeded Rice's career totals in all three Triple Crown categories - Ted Williams, Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Stan Musial, Jimmie Foxx, Hank Aaron, Mel Ott, Willie Mays and Mickey Mantle?) Those are always fun, but they don't tell us much. And besides, I think the more detailed numbers above are harder to argue with.

Now will you please just vote for the guy so I can start bugging you about other candidates? (Alan Trammell, for example, springs to mind.)

Regards as always,

Paul White

In Defense of Defense

Of the four main criticisms of Jim Rice’s talents, the attack on his defensive prowess is the most widespread.

• "A dominant hitter for a decade, but he didn’t walk, didn’t steal, and didn’t field." Jon Heyman, The Sporting News, 12/21/2000.
• "I voted for Rice three years ago but not the past two. Obviously, Rice did nothing in that time to diminish his candidacy. He certainly was a dominant player for 10 years, and I considered him a more feared hitter than first-ballot lock Dave Winfield. Why, then, did I change my mind? To me, a Hall of Famer should be a complete player. Rice's defensive inadequacies bother me. He didn’t run as well as Puckett or Winfield. He was ‘just’ a slugger – though a fabulous one, at that." Ken Rosenthal, The Sporting News, 1/1/2001.
• "My reservation about Rice is that he was a one dimensional player…You essentially have to vote him in as a hitter only, because he DH-ed extensively. He gave you no speed, no Gold Gloves, no off-field ‘character-and-integrity’ points." Jayson Stark, ESPN.com, 1/15/2001
• "[Rice was] a one-dimensional, no-speed, no-defense left fielder…" Dan Shaughnessy, The Boston Globe, 1/9/2002

One common theme among the criticisms is a complete lack of supporting documentation. These are opinions only, some not even based upon first-hand observation. In addition, each of these comments was written more than a decade after Rice’s retirement. Do they represent the opinions held at the time Rice played, or those expressed by his teammates, managers, coaches, or those who observed him play? In a word, no.

• "…He plays The Wall almost as well as Yastrzemski did in his prime. His arm is as good as any left-fielder’s in the league, and he routinely holds balls off The Big Green Thing to singles." Steve Wulf, Sports Illustrated, 8/6/1984
• "While Rice’s hitting commands attention, he also has mastered the art of playing balls off the left-field wall. On several occasions this year, he’s either thrown runners out (he has 10 assists) at second or held the hitter to a single with his barehanded grabs of balls coming off the Green Monster." Joe Giuliotti, The Sporting News, 9/20/1982
• "With George Scott injured and Yaz filling in at first base, Rice has played more in the outfield this season, and played it well." Time, 6/12/1978
• "He took over for me in left field and really learned how to judge balls off the left field wall." Carl Yastrzemski, RedSox.com, 1/29/2001
• "…He became a better-than-average left fielder who could really play that Fenway Park wall." Don Zimmer, RedSox.com, 1/29/2001
• "He may have been the hardest working ballplayer I was ever associated with. We would go out to the park before anyone, and I would hit ball after ball to him in left field. He became a master of playing that tricky Green Monster wall." Johnny Pesky, RedSox.com, 1/29/2001
• "In ’75, his rookie season, Rice played 98 games in left, didn't make an error, threw out six runners and played the unpredictable caroms off the Fenway Green Monster flawlessly." Mark Ribowsky, Sport, July, 1978.
• "Rice always worked on his skills…Despite his speed, arm strength, and body control that allowed him to dive and cradle the ball without the jar of landing, he had to work hard on playing left field…Five days a week he would take fungoes from Pesky, first practicing charging grounders, then taking flies off The Wall. After eight seasons, he finally got out of the shadow of Yastrezemski, whose unique style of playing left field like a shortstop had paled anyone else who went out there. But by his ninth year in Boston, Rice, too, owned the new Wall, and in 1983 he had as many assists (twenty-one) as Yaz ever had in one season and probably should have won a Gold Glove for fielding excellence. Dwight Evans, who had the worst defensive year of his career, won one instead, proving clearly the value of a reputation." Peter Gammons, Beyond the Sixth Game, 1985.

The anecdotal evidence from first hand observers makes it clear that Rice developed a solid defensive reputation during his playing days. Only later did writers – usually writers who only witnessed a hobbled, aging Rice in his final three seasons – paint him as a defensive liability. It’s an easy, albeit incorrect, conclusion to draw for those who saw his waning days, when in reality Rice was worn down by a dozen years of playing through every injury that didn’t involve broken bones.

Besides, as Gammons pointed out, it took Rice a while to earn that good reputation. When he first arrived in Boston, he began his career playing more games at DH than most players his age since he was literally surrounded by Gold Glove winners who commanded more playing time in the field.

The 1975 Sox featured more defensive talent than any team in the franchise’s history. Catcher was manned by Carlton Fisk, second base by Doug Griffin, shortstop by Rick Burleson, first base by Carl Yastrzemski, center field by Fred Lynn, and right field by Dwight Evans. Each of those men won one or more Gold Gloves in their careers. Even the Sox primary DH, Cecil Cooper, went on the win two Gold Gloves at first base. Only in left field and at third base did the Sox lack a former or future Gold Glover, though neither Rice nor Rico Petrocelli was a slouch with the glove. Beyond the everyday defensive excellence, the Sox also featured two reserve outfielders, Rick Miller and Juan Beniquez, who eventually went on to win Gold Gloves.

With this much defensive prowess surrounding him, it’s no wonder that Rice came off looking like a poor defender. Perhaps, at that stage of his career, he really did pale in comparison. The reality, of course, is much more complex than that. Calling Rice the worst defender on the late-1970s Red Sox is like calling a guy slow because he finished last in the Olympic 100-meter dash. It’s simply not a fair comparison.

Beyond the problem of failing to measure up to his stellar teammates, Rice faces the problem of all left fielders. Bluntly, left fielders get no respect. At least, that’s the case when it comes to defense.

With the exception of a privileged few, like Barry Bonds, left fielders are always thought of as these massive clods who can’t play any other position. Their managers just stick them out in left to keep them from hurting the team and hurting themselves. To most people, Greg Luzinski and Ron Kittle are the prototypes for left fielders.

And it isn’t just the fans that hold this view; it’s the view that is officially condoned by major league baseball. The decision several decades ago to allow Gold Gloves for outfield play to be handed out to any three outfielders, regardless of position, has resulted in left fielders being virtually ignored for their defensive contributions. Year after year, three center fielders are awarded, with an occasional strong-armed right fielder thrown in. Left fielders get only the scraps.

From the inception of the Gold Glove in 1957, through the 2001 season, 135 Gold Gloves have been given to American League outfielders. Just 19 of those went to left fielders, and never more than one in any year. Of those, 15 are accounted for by just four men - Carl Yastrzemski (7), Minnie Minoso (3), Joe Rudi (3) and Dave Winfield (2 – the rest of his awards were for playing right field).

When Darin Erstad was awarded a Gold Glove in 2000, he was the first American League left fielder to be so awarded since Winfield in 1983. Even then, Winfield was a guy who made his reputation elsewhere, having already won two Gold Gloves as a right fielder in the National League. He didn’t actually deserve the award in 1983, or the previous year for that matter. Several AL left fielders were better, but Winfield had the reputation that he brought with him from right field.

When the situation is really considered, it’s clear that left fielders are in a silly position. Even pitchers get their own Gold Gloves. Does anyone in their right mind think pitchers make a bigger contribution with their glove than left fielders do? That’s ridiculous.

Consider the best-fielding pitcher ever, Jim Kaat, owner of sixteen consecutive Gold Gloves. During those sixteen seasons, theoretically playing the greatest defense of any pitcher ever, Kaat averaged just 1.48 chances per outing. That’s it. Even the worst-ever left fielder, let’s call him Lonnie Smith for argument’s sake, averaged 1.90 chances per game. And that’s a guy with truly awful range compared to the (supposedly) best fielding pitcher in baseball history. We’ve got to assume that the gap between an average pitcher and average left fielder is about a full chance per game. Multiply that by 140 to 160 games that a regular left fielder will play each year compared to the 35 starts a pitcher gets and we find that a left fielder will handle the ball about 250-275 more times per year than a pitcher. But somehow, it’s the pitcher that is awarded for his glove work.

So, what if this dumb rule didn’t exist? What if a Gold Glove were awarded to each outfield position, just as each infield position is awarded? Which left fielders in history would have received those awards each year, thus escaping the usual left field stereotype?

Of course, we’re not going to be able to reproduce the real voting process. And thank God for that. After all this is the system that gave Rafael Palmeiro a Gold Glove for playing just 28 games at first base, and one of those awards to Joe Rudi was for playing that grand total of 44 outfield games in 1975. Obviously this isn’t a system worth replicating, so we’re going to have to dig into the wonderful world of defensive statistics. There are a couple of ways to go about this.

First, the time consuming one. Using the fabulous Baseball-Reference.com web site, it’s simple to determine each team’s regular left fielder over the past 45 years, since Gold Gloves have been in existence. In some cases teams didn’t have a true regular. They would have one guy who played 45 games in left and another two or three who played 20-30 games each. So, largely to avoid some stupid statistical anomaly that would give the award to a guy who played 25 games in left field, for the purposes of this discussion eligibility will be limited to players who played at least half of their team’s games in left field.

With each of these players identified, their individual defensive numbers were examined. These numbers included each player’s Putouts per Game, Assists per Chance, Double Plays per Chance, Fielding Percentage times Chances, and Range Factor. These were used to level out the advantages that would have gone to those players who played 150 games instead of 120 or 110. But, to give credit for durability, each player was also given points for the number of total outfield games played.

Here’s the math, using Jim Rice’s 1980 season as an example. Rice played 109 games in the outfield, and totaled 233 putouts, 10 assists, 2 double plays, a .988 fielding percentage and a 2.23 range factor (RF). These translate to 2.14 putouts per game (PO/G), .041 assists per chance (A/C), .0081 double plays per chance (DP/C), and a 243.048 score in fielding percentage times chances (FP/C). With these calculated, they are compared to all of the other eleven left fielders who qualified for the award that year. Rice ranked seventh in games (this was the year he missed almost two months with a broken wrist), seventh in PO/G, fourth in A/C, third in DP/C, sixth in FP/C, and seventh in RF. After all of the ordinals are added, Rice has a total score of 34, which ranks fourth among the twelve eligible left fielders. Ben Oglivie’s total of 21 was the best. We’ll call this one the Defensive Statistics Method, or DSM since all baseball stats have to have an acronym. It’s a federal law.

Kind of ugly, but ultimately it works. We know this because the folks who publish Total Baseball have their own handy-dandy statistic, called Fielding Runs. Without getting too detailed, Fielding Runs (FR) calculates the numbers of runs each player contributed to his team each year based solely on defense. That math won’t be replicated here, just trust that they’ve done a ton of work to make FR a meaningful measurement of defensive value.

By comparing the highest FR scores each year we find that they track pretty closely with the simplistic DSM calculations described above. Looking at all American League seasons from 1957 through 1998, for 28 of those 42 years, the Gold Glove winner determined by DSM matched with the winner determined by FR. In eleven of the remaining fourteen seasons, the winner in DSM finished second or third in FR. So there is agreement two-thirds of the time and near-agreement for about 80% of the remainder. There is only one true outlyer, the 1970 season, during which FR favors Roy White while DSM favors Felipe Alou, who was a subpar outfielder (-3 FR) according to Total Baseball that season. Hey, defensive statistics are notoriously nebulous, so if there had been complete agreement between the two methods, someone probably would have uncovered it long ago.

Still, as a whole, we’ve got a pretty good basis for determining who deserved a left field Gold Glove in those years. To break ties between the two methods, the player with the best general reputation as a defender was chosen as the winner. Those winners were:

• 1957 Charlie Maxwell
• 1958 Bob Cerv
• 1959 Minnie Minoso
• 1960 Minnie Minoso
• 1961 Rocky Colavito
• 1962 Rocky Colavito
• 1963 Carl Yastrzemski
• 1964 Chuck Hinton
• 1965 Bob Allison
• 1966 Carl Yastrzemski
• 1967 Carl Yastrzemski
• 1968 Carl Yastrzemski
• 1969 Lou Piniella
• 1970 Roy White
• 1971 Carl Yastrzemski
• 1972 Lou Piniella
• 1973 Johnny Briggs
• 1974 Johnny Briggs
• 1975 Roy White
• 1976 Larry Hisle
• 1977 Carl Yastrzemski
• 1978 Jim Rice
• 1979 Willie Wilson
• 1980 Rickey Henderson
• 1981 Willie Wilson
• 1982 Gary Ward
• 1983 Gary Ward
• 1984 Jim Rice
• 1985 Mickey Hatcher
• 1986 Jim Rice
• 1987 Jose Canseco
• 1988 Dan Gladden
• 1989 Rickey Henderson
• 1990 Dan Gladden
• 1991 Tim Raines
• 1992 Brady Anderson
• 1993 Albert Belle
• 1994 Brady Anderson
• 1995 Marty Cordova
• 1996 Tony Phillips
• 1997 Garrett Anderson
• 1998 Albert Belle

There were three tough judgement calls in there that went against Roy White, Ben Oglivie and Tim Raines, respectively, but there they are. Notice how much reputation comes into play in the actual voting. Of the few left fielders who actually did receive multiple Gold Gloves in real life, all of them had their totals decreased using these methods. Yastrzemski and Minoso each lost one award, while Rudi and Winfield lost all of theirs.

You’re probably saying, "Yeah, but how good could these guys be compared to REAL Gold Glove winners? Center fielders and right fielders are just more valuable as defenders, so who cares if these guys got snubbed?" Well, these guys actually compare very well. The real, live Gold Glove recipients average just about 9 Fielding Runs in their awarded seasons. The left fielders above average just about 13 FR in these seasons, so who was more valuable defensively to their respective teams?

Of these forty-two seasons, just seven were actually awarded with a Gold Glove – Minoso in 1959 and 1960, and Yastrzemski in 1963, 1967, 1968, 1971, and 1977. The rest of these men were essentially stiffed by the lords of baseball, with the result that many of them are generally remembered as bad defenders or as slow designated hitters.

It’s simply not true. Under a fair awards system, each of these men would have likely received one or more Gold Gloves. In fact, in Jim Rice’s case, he would have received three Gold Gloves, tied for the second most among all American League left fielders, trailing only Yastrzemski’s six. Due to a silly rule and an unfair reputation, he received none.

Since defensive statistics are still evolving, it makes sense to also examine the measurement that has evolved the most. In 2002, Bill James published his latest work, Win Shares, in which he claims to have developed the most accurate method for measuring defensive prowess yet. In his book from the previous year, "The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract", he went so far as to claim that Win Shares measures defensive contributions, "vastly better than any previous analysis." In general, sabermetricians seem to agree with him.

Again, without explaining all of James’ math, Win Shares works like this – the players on every team in history are awarded shares of each of the team’s wins. Each win can be divided into three shares, so a team that wins 100 games has 300 Win Shares to divide among its roster. James has devised a method of allocating those shares based on each players’ offensive, defensive, and, if applicable, pitching performances.

During his career, Jim Rice accumulated 35.6 Win Shares for his defensive play. That compares well to other outfielders, particularly corner outfielders. For instance, nineteen different retired Gold Glove winners posted lower career totals. To be fair, Rice played a relatively long career, so his raw total of defensive Win Shares should be higher than most players’ totals. A more fair comparison would be to examine his Win Shares per 1000 defensive innings played. Rice posted 2.63 Fielding Win Shares per 1000 innings in the field. Thirteen different Gold Glove-winning outfielders, men who combined to win 36 outfield Gold Gloves, posted equal or lower figures:

• Hank Aaron 2.63
• Dave Parker 2.63
• Sixto Lezcano 2.62
• Frank Robinson 2.58
• Roger Maris 2.56
• Ellis Valentine 2.48
• Rickey Henderson 2.42
• Joe Rudi 2.41
• Wally Moon 2.37
• Barry Bonds 2.26
• Tony Gwynn 2.26
• Jay Buhner 2.04
• Dave Winfield 1.92

Another group of 15 Gold Glovers finished just ahead of Rice:

• Carl Yastrzemski 2.65
• Raul Mondesi 2.66
• Dusty Baker 2.70
• Al Kaline 2.70
• Jackie Jensen 2.72
• Tony Oliva 2.76
• Minnie Minoso 2.76
• Rick Manning 2.79
• Bobby Murcer 2.79
• Dale Murphy 2.80
• Bobby Bonds 2.81
• Dwight Evans 2.82
• Pete Rose 2.85
• Roberto Clemente 2.87
• Al Cowens 2.90

James took the extra step of assigning letter grades to each player for their defensive prowess. Rice received a C+, which certainly appears to be only slightly better than mediocre until we examine the others who received the same or similar grade. Carl Yastrzemski and his seven Gold Gloves playing the same left field as Rice also scored a C+. Dwight Evans and his eight Gold Gloves across the Fenway outfield scored a B-. Hank Aaron and Frank Robinson were C+ defenders. Roberto Clemente was a B-. So was Al Kaline. We’re talking about perhaps the finest corner outfielders, in terms of defense, in the game’s history.

In fact, very few corner outfielders rank higher than the C+/B- range because James lumped them in with center fielders when passing out grades. Obviously, center fielders are of higher defensive value because more balls are hit to them. James asserts, and there is really no reason to doubt him, that the data simply wasn’t there to allow the corner outfielders to be separated. Fair enough. But what that means is that the scale for corner outfielders’ grades has to be shifted downward a bit. Those in the D+/C- range were probably average. Anyone in the C/C+ range was a good defender, anyone in the B-/B+ range was outstanding, anyone higher was a freak of nature.

That scale would hold to form if we examine just the left fielders currently in the Hall of Fame.

• Al Simmons - A
• Fred Clarke - A-
• Joe Kelley - A-
• Stan Musial - B
• Jesse Burkett - B
• Joe Medwick - B-
• Ed Delahanty - B-
• Zack Wheat - B-
• Carl Yastrzemski - C+
• Goose Goslin - C+
• Jim O’Rourke - C+
• Ted Williams - C
• Billy Williams - C
• Chick Hafey - C
• Heinie Manush - C
• Willie Stargell - C-
• Ralph Kiner - C-
• Lou Brock - C-

Only eight of the eighteen posted better defensive grades than Jim Rice, with seven ranking lower and three being tied with a C+. So, in short, Jim Rice would be an average defensive left fielder compared to others in the Hall of Fame. That’s not a bad label to have.

Of course, this fact didn’t stop Bill James from making false statements about Rice’s defense either. James took a great deal of time and space in his comments about Roy White to demonstrate why he felt White was a better overall left fielder than Jim Rice. When he compared them as defenders, he was very short on facts and very long on opinion. With just one sentence, he judges the competition in favor of White, with no supporting documentation whatsoever.

"Jim Rice wasn’t a bad outfielder, but Roy White obviously was better."

It might be obvious to James, but it certainly isn’t obvious to the Total Baseball authors. Their statistic for measuring defense, Fielding Runs, ends in a dead heat. Each man compiled 71 Fielding Runs in his career. Since Rice played slightly fewer outfield games, he actually accumulated a better rate of Fielding Runs per game played. To put those 71 Fielding Runs in context, only twelve Hall of Fame outfielders have exceeded that total. In addition, Rice’s figure of 0.046 Fielding Runs per outfield game played is bettered by just seven Hall of Famers – Richie Ashburn, Max Carey, Roberto Clemente, Willie Mays, Kirby Puckett, Tris Speaker, and Carl Yastrzemski. It’s a who’s who of outfield defense.

The distinction between Rice and White shouldn’t be obvious to casual observers using traditional statistics either. In fewer games and fewer outfield plays, Rice threw out almost 60% more baserunners than White and participated in more double plays. He totals nearly as many putouts despite playing in the smallest left field in baseball, one with literally no foul ground, while White played in one of the largest. His putout totals were further depressed by the fact that the Red Sox usually had a pitching staff dominated by right-handed pitching, again due to the perceived vagaries of Fenway Park. During Rice’s full career, less than one-quarter of all innings thrown by Red Sox pitchers were accounted for by lefties, which of course resulted in fewer balls being hit toward Rice in left field. He did make more errors and consequently had a lower fielding percentage (.980 to White’s .988), so a review of the facts might indicate that the two players had equal defensive value. It certainly wouldn’t indicate that either player was "obviously" better.

And, in James’ case, it really shouldn’t have been obvious because he had just developed a defensive evaluation tool that was, in his own words, "vastly better than any previous analysis." It was this analysis that he used to develop his rankings, so obviously he had the results in hand when he claimed White was a better defender than Rice. Well, according to Win Shares, he wasn’t. In fact, the opposite was true. While the previous methods for evaluating defense ended in a dead heat between the two, James’ method gives Rice the advantage. Rice had a letter grade of C+ while White got a C. Rice totaled 2.63 Win Shares per 1000 innings in the outfield. Roy White totaled just 2.44.

So, you see, even Bill James, paragon of baseball research and analysis, isn’t above making statements that fly in the face of facts – even when he’s the one who analyzed the facts. More often than not, when it comes to commentary on Jim Rice’s defensive abilities, those statements unfairly chip away at his reputation and his claim to a place in the Hall of Fame.

Good Company

Let's start out slow. I won't be throwing around any modified numbers or sabermetric mumbo-jumbo in this one. In the future, I'll bring plenty of those new-fangled doo-dads to bear, but for now I prefer to deal with the indisputable. Too many people start taking pot shots once the data is manipulated, even if the manipulations make perfect sense. So let's look at Jim Ed's actual numbers in some kind of context, shall we?

Today's tidbits:For everyday players, home runs, RBI and batting average - a.k.a. the Triple Crown categories - are the ones most heavily cited in Hall of Fame cases. I'm not saying it's right or wrong, it just is. So, what would constitute a reasonable set of minimum threshholds in each of these categories if a player wanted to be seriously considered for the Hall? Playing with the numbers a bit reveals that there have been a total of 63 men in the history of the game who posted at least 300 home runs, 1000 RBI and a batting average of .270. Nineteen of those men are not yet eligible for the Hall, leaving 44 who are. Of those, 28 have been inducted. That's 63.6%, almost two thirds, so these would seem to be decent credentials. Not a certain HOFer, but a pretty solid case.

But what if we ratcheted them up a notch? If we set the theshholds at 325 HR, 1100 RBI and a .280 average, we find just 24 eligible men in the game's history. Almost 90% of them, 21 to be exact, have already been inducted to the Hall, so now we're clearly in an area where election in almost certain.

But what about the next level? Pushing the minimums up even further, to 350 HRs, 1200 RBI and a .290 average, reveals just seventeen eligible men in the history of baseball. Another seven - Barry Bonds, Rafael Palmeiro, Ken Griffey Jr., Juan Gonzalez, Jeff Bagwell, Frank Thomas, and Albert Belle - have also achieved these levels, but obviously aren't eligible for induction yet. Of the 17 who are, 16 have already been elected.

As you've probably guessed, the only eligible man in the history of baseball who met or exceeded each of these lofty numbers without being elected to the Hall of Fame (yet), is James Edward Rice. Check out the 16 men he is sharing company with (in ascending order of homers):

• Johnny Mize
• Joe DiMaggio
• Orlando Cepeda
• Al Kaline
• Duke Snider
• Billy Williams
• Stan Musial
• Lou Gehrig
• Mel Ott
• Ted Williams
• Jimmie Foxx
• Mickey Mantle
• Frank Robinson
• Willie Mays
• Babe Ruth
• Hank Aaron

It would be quite easy for anyone else to look these up. Even if you don't have a computer to take you to the sortable historic stats at MLB.com, "Total Baseball" has been available for better than a decade. Why, then, doesn't anyone mention the fact that Jim Rice's actual career Triple Crown numbers are of historically significant proportions? Beats me. Hopefully, using this space, I can help fill that void.